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AGRICULTURAL LAND-DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN 
ZIMBABWE: A REVIEW OF FOUR DECADES OF SAM 
MOYO’S WORK ON AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKETS 
AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS
Rangarirai Gavin MUCHETU
Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies
ABSTRACT   Rights to land have changed hands several times across Zimbabwe’s racial, 
class, socioeconomic, and political divides over the past century. This has occurred through 
greatly varying mechanisms, depending more on sociopolitical power dynamics and less on 
the supply and demand of land. Discussion of agricultural land-delivery systems in Zimbabwe 
requires an understanding of the deeply embedded socioeconomic and political factors that 
have driven supply and demand of agrarian land. This paper examines Professor Sam Moyo’s 
work on the evolution of land markets from the pre-independence era through the 2000s to 
the development of the new emerging land-market transactions in the countryside. Moyo’s 
work shows how the state-led land-delivery system reconfigured the agrarian structure, 
changing it from a bimodal to a trimodal system. Giving due consideration to the different 
economic models that have been pursued by the Government of Zimbabwe since independence, 
and investigating how these have shaped power relations with regard to land, we attempt, 
from a political economy perspective, to develop an understanding of the land-reform 
program. Moyo’s work on Zimbabwe’s land markets shows how market-based approaches to 
land redistribution will always be inadequate for addressing social and historical injustices, 
because they favor capital at the expense of the peasantry. This article utilizes a tri-modal 
agrarian structure to analyze recent data from a 2013–2015 survey conducted by Sam Moyo 
Agrarian Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS). These data support Moyo’s arguments: 
for example, that the pressure for Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) emanated from 
below, and that a spectrum of beneficiaries, outside the usual political elite, accessed land. 
Data analyses revealed continued demand for land from both local (informal markets) and 
international (large land deals) players, further substantiating Moyo’s claim that there 
remains an unresolved land question in Zimbabwe. 
Key Words: Land markets; Land reform; Land delivery systems; Fast Track Land Reform 
Program; Land demand and supply.
INTRODUCTION
Land markets are sensitive and complex because land is immovable, which 
problematizes its commodification. Land is a social good and a human right. 
Therefore, land markets deal in the methods, nature, and extent of transferability 
of rights to a piece of land. A number of different types of land markets exist, 
such as agricultural and non-agricultural, urban and rural, and formal and informal 
land markets. These markets continuously intersect and overlap, meaning that 
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the existence of one market does not supersede the existence of others. In this 
paper, land refers to rural agricultural land. Descriptions of land markets and/
or land-delivery channels over the past four decades, therefore, describe the 
methods, processes, and trajectories of the claims of different groups of people 
to agricultural land rights. This paper accounts for the effects of inequitable land 
access, landlessness, and differentiated control of quality land on the different 
land-delivery systems utilized in Zimbabwe. National land markets are thoroughly 
politicized, forming the basis for mainstream national agendas. Trade in land, 
in Zimbabwe as elsewhere, constitutes direct trade of people’s means of 
production, wealth, and source of sociopolitical influence and status. Governments 
have thus always tried to control land and protect it from the vagaries of 
unfettered global markets. Land reform and land redistribution have been at the 
forefront of the Zimbabwe national agenda dating back to the liberation struggle 
itself. The discussions of the pre-independence Lancaster House Conference 
(LHC) almost broke down because of disagreements on the land question.
One of the first scholars to write on these issues was the former President 
of CODESRIA (2008–2011) and former Executive Director of the Sam Moyo 
African Institute for Agrarian Studies (SMAIAS) (2002–2015), the late Professor 
Sam Moyo (1954–2015). His arguments, whether through assimilation or 
opposition, have found their way into discussions of agrarian-land markets and 
reform. His work covered food production and productivity, food security and 
sovereignty, rural poverty and underdevelopment, agricultural input and output 
markets, and agrarian land reform and markets. Moyo was an academic guru 
whose influence and research transcended political, economic, and academic 
boundaries. This paper takes up his preferred theoretical framework, the political 
economy approach, to understand the evolution of agricultural land markets in 
Zimbabwe. We aimed to understand the economic, political, and social factors 
that have driven demand and supply in land and land-related policies from 
independence to the FTLRP and beyond.
Moyo’s writing on land markets elucidated the land question in Zimbabwe 
and how it has been affected by 1) the characteristics of the people demanding 
land and 2) the economic model adopted by the state, which has implications 
for the land tenure system (security or insecurity) to be followed. In his rural 
and agrarian development studies, which span four decades, Moyo viewed land 
reform as a necessary but not sufficient condition for agrarian reform and national 
development, thus viewing the land question (and the agrarian question even 
more so) as being far from being resolved (Moyo & Matondi, 2004). In theoretical 
discourse, therefore, Moyo hypothesized that land reform was not enough to 
create an inclusive development of rural spaces. Without complementary support 
for the agrarian market, simultaneously increasing rural development and reducing 
poverty would remain problematic. Moyo wrote extensively on how market-led 
land reforms would always favor the wealthy and achieve inefficient redistribution 
outcomes. Issues such as historical race and class-based land ownership 
imbalances could not, in his view, be addressed through market-led land 
reform. Moyo argued that social equity in land access was best achieved 
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through state-led land reform, which had to be radical in nature, given the 
pervasiveness of neo-liberalism in post-colonial Zimbabwe.
One of Moyo’s major contributions to Zimbabwean agrarian studies was the 
proposal of a state-led reform to dismantle the existing bimodal agrarian structure 
in favor of a trimodal one. The former consisted of inequitable relations of land 
ownership, with large-scale farmers possessing private property rights, while 
peasants held communal tenure rights. Integration into the input and output 
markets differed immensely between these two. Prior to the new agrarian structure, 
differentiation was polarized, with the large-scale farmers being in complete control 
of the land markets and well-integrated into export markets for lucrative cash 
crops (Moyo, 2011a: 202–204). Moyo (2014) argued that market-led land-delivery 
systems perpetuated this dualism, because large-scale landowners would have better 
chances over peasants in purchasing land if such systems were adopted. Thus, the 
resultant tri-modal agrarian structure, incorporating large-scale farmers, numerous 
small-to-medium capitalist farmers, and an expanded peasantry, could only be 
brought about through non-market-led land reforms. The tri-modal agrarian 
framework ideally supports arguments of re-peasantization and semi-proletarianization, 
which have serious implications for post-reform class and accumulation analysis 
(not discussed in this paper). Thus, it is imperative to draw lessons from Moyo’s 
works, which covered the trajectory taken by land markets (and land policy) under 
the various national economic production models adopted in Zimbabwe. The span 
of his work extends from the time before the land-market phases of the LHC 
agreement, through land market liberalization (late 1980s to 1990s), and land 
reform (2000s) to the emerging land market deals in the agricultural sector (2010 
and beyond). This paper approaches land markets through the lens of the research 
of this great land and agrarian expert. 
LAND IN CONTEXT
Zimbabwe’s economy fundamentally depends on agriculture, as do most 
economies of southern Africa. Approximately 70% of the population derives 
their livelihood from it directly, and it accounted for an average of 16% of the 
GDP over the last five years (World Bank, 2017). Understanding land access 
goes beyond understanding agricultural land values and the prices that it attracts 
on the supply and demand schedules, as it encompasses a variety of other factors 
that are difficult to quantify and that have a bearing on agricultural land markets. 
Before discussing the evolution of the land markets, it is important to 
conceptualize the terms used, specifically with regard to the complexities of 
trading agricultural land on the open market. 
I. Land as a Commodity
Market-led redistribution of land requires land to be tradable, that is, to be 
considered as a commodity. The ease or difficulty of commodifying agricultural 
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land hinges on the definition of land. There are a number of definitions of land 
in the literature, depending on the field of study. In economics, land, together 
with labor and capital, form the basic factors of production. It is associated with 
an economic value, expressed in price per hectare at ownership, transfer or when 
paying for its use (rent). Modern scholarship has broadened the definition to 
reflect other non-productive uses. Land has become any delineable area of the 
earth’s terrestrial surface, encompassing all attributes of the biosphere immediately 
above or below this surface (rivers, swamps), the plant and animal populations 
of that area, settlements and physical results of past and present human activity 
on that part of the terrestrial surface (UN, 1994; FAO, 1995). How we define 
land has implications for our understanding of demand and supply and, inevitably, 
on its value in the ‘market.’ Moyo & Skalness (1990) argued that it was 
inadequate to define land in an economic context only, and that struggles for 
land and the political economy of land reforms should also be considered. 
In this respect, viewing (agricultural) land as a commodity becomes problematic 
for the simple reason that its market value is not merely affected by production 
costs. Supply and demand schedules on their own cannot explain the value 
attached to a piece of land that has a river flowing through it, trees, minerals 
underneath it, and the graves and memories of a particular group of inhabitants. 
Land values in economic principle are determined by the demand of land, which 
in turn is affected by the intended use of that land relative to the supply of 
other lands for that particular use. This type of analysis of land markets reveals 
a disarticulated market system for land, where two attached pieces of land can 
have different prices or values.
Moreover, the land question in Africa needs to be examined in the wider 
context of struggles over land rights “embedded” in the control, by external 
capital and the state, of extensive lands, which harbor minerals and other 
valuable natural resources (Moyo, 2007)
Market-based transactions are considered to be efficient, equitable, 
environmentally sound, and compatible with other sectors of the economy. While 
this is easily applicable to markets for real commodities, it does not apply to 
agricultural land markets. From a political economy perspective, Moyo showed 
how complex it is to assign a value to any piece of land, because it can be 
linked to alternative land uses, which change over time. The discovery of a 
precious mineral or the intention of constructing residential or industrial 
infrastructure can drastically change land values. In addition, two different land 
values may exist for peri-urban and non-peri-urban agricultural land with similar 
land uses. In some pre-Zimbabwe land valuations (1965 to 1990s), the racial 
category of the user and the size of the land were used to determine the value. 
The exclusive use of supply and demand schedules to determine land values 
resulted in the commodification of land, a commodity that can be traded regardless 
of its sociocultural dimension. The commodification of land had serious 
exclusionary effects on socioeconomically vulnerable groups (the downtrodden), 
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such as women and children. The downtrodden have an insatiable desire for 
land but do not have the means (resources) to purchase it on the free market; 
thus, they lack effective demand. They do not have the means to purchase land 
unless it is provided to them for free. The essence of a market-led land-delivery 
system is that it seeks to permanently transfer land from less efficient producers 
to more efficient users. This land-delivery system would exclude the downtrodden, 
with their limited educational skills and access to capital and credit.
II. Conceptualization of Land Markets in Zimbabwe
As noted, if land were a commodity, its price would be affected by factors 
of 1) supply (price of the complementary or substitute goods, number of sellers 
in the market, and production costs) and 2) demand (incomes, consumer tastes 
and preferences, number of consumers, and potential future prices). Although 
this paper does discuss the behavior of the suppliers of land, it dwells more on 
the behavior of the demanders and how they eventually triggered a paradigm 
shift in the land-delivery system. Soon after independence, neo-liberal policies 
forced land seekers to access land through market-led land-delivery systems. 
Pressure for the creation of market-based land access in Zimbabwe mainly 
originated from international capital, the LHC agreement, and the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) (Moyo & Matondi, 2004; Shivji, 2009; 
Moyo, 2010). However, this approach, which depended on responding to market 
supply and demand, was problematic, for the following reasons:
(1) There were too few sellers: these were less than 5000 white settlers 
who had control of over 15 million hectares of prime arable agricultural 
land (Utete, 2003). Markets are inefficient when the supply of a good is 
concentrated in the hands of a few (monopoly).
(2) The behavior of these few sellers was highly unpredictable, as they 
were not responding to demands for land by the majority of the 
Zimbabweans.
(3) The buyer of the land, the state (on behalf of the people) was financially 
crippled and unable to drive effective demand.
(4) There is no substitute for agricultural land.
(5) In a purely competitive market, the government plays a regulatory role, 
guaranteeing fair practices in the market. However, according to the LHC 
agreement, the government was required to take an active role, as it had 
the first right of refusal for all agricultural land that was presented by 
white commercial farmers. From 1980–1990, the government received 
funds from Britain, bought land, and redistributed it to its people, albeit 
at a slow pace (see section 3). This then presented policy and ideological 
inconsistences.
Moyo disagreed with Bojo (1993) and other scholars who argued that direct 
state participation in land markets distorted land-use values. African land markets 
do not respond only to market forces but are also affected by the history of 
land appropriations during the settler regimes. They are marred by class, gender, 
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racial, and ethnic inequalities that can never be addressed by market forces; 
thus, the participation of the state is required. In this regard, understanding land 
markets requires a political economy approach to answer various national land 
questions. The land question that has been the focus of much of Moyo’s work 
is concerned with the following:
[…] the adequacy of the quantity and quality of land […], the method 
and costs of land acquisition and redistribution, the efficiency of land use 
in both the large farm and resettlement areas, the suitability of those 
benefiting from land redistribution, the fairness and equitability of 
procedures for dealing with land demands, and the economic impact of 
land reform (Moyo, 1994).
LAND SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Agricultural land markets have seen a myriad of characteristic changes, 
from peasants to white settlers (appropriation and colonization), to the slow 
market-based land reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and the more recent 
FTLRP (white settlers to the peasants). Thus, land markets have been 
determined by who controlled the land, the type of tenure by which it was 
Fig. 1. Forms and sources of agricultural land demand in Zimbabwe
Source: Adapted from Sam Moyo, various writings.
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controlled, and the level or intensity of demand for the land by those who did 
not have land. These three variables formed the basis for the supply and demand 
functions for land in Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2005a). Furthermore, to understand land 
demand, an analysis of the social dimensions (connections, agency, and 
organization level) of the land seekers, and their place in a broad economic 
model and property rights regime had to be determined. The demand for land 
needs to be understood before we can understand how land markets evolved. 
This demand has taken various forms and emanated from various sources since 
the birth of the country (Fig. 1).
Moyo highlights how each source of demand has a different power or influence 
in the land markets. Different forms of demand can be linked but cannot be 
tied exclusively to one source. For example, traditional authorities may be heavily 
linked to demands for restitution, but it may also apply pressure for redistribution. 
The social, political, and economic dimensions (goals and ideology) of each 
particular grouping determine the type and extent of demand thereof (Moyo & 
Matondi, 2004). Before the reforms, land markets in Zimbabwe were dominated 
by a minority of white settlers exercising private property rights. Moyo discusses 
the different degrees of power and goals of the above-mentioned sources of 
demand within the context of 1) the socialist policies initially adopted in 
Zimbabwe (1980–1990), 2) the liberalization of the economy, and 3) the adoption 
of the FTLRP.
I. Structure of Land Markets from 1980 to 1997
The FTLRP was not a static policy but a continuum set in motion by the 
arrival of white settlers in the 1890s through to the 1960s (the land alienation 
period). A number of land reform experts have focused on the events that took 
place after independence, and some even isolate the 2000 land reform in their 
analysis of land reforms. After Europeans had settled in present day Zimbabwe, 
their new government controlled land markets and, in most cases, local indigenous 
populations were not allowed to purchase freehold land. It was only later, in 
the 1930s, that Native Purchase Areas were created to allow a small black elite 
to participate in the land markets. Beginning in the 1930s, through a number 
of laws (the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of 1931, 
and the Tribal Trust Lands of 1965), oversize tracts of land were appropriated 
by the white settlers and converted to private property, creating a dualistic 
agrarian structure. This means the contemporary land question in Zimbabwe 
originated in geo-political, economic, social and demographic factors as well as 
in the current widespread global imperative (Moyo, 1992).
In 1980, the government faced the task of trying to correct the existing 
imbalance, which was deeply imbedded along racial and class lines. Approximately 
70,000 white settlers controlled 70% of the agricultural land, while a group of 
black indigenous people 100 times as large had access to 15% of relatively 
less-productive lands (Moyo, 2000a). In this section, we discuss the pre-FTLRP 
attempts to redistribute land under different economic models and, hence, separate 
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the discussion into two sections: 1980 to 1997. Later years are discussed in 
next section.
1. Economic model and sources of land demand (1980–1990)
In the first decade following independence, the government sought to access 
and control land within the framework set by the 1980 LHC agreement. From 
1980 to 1985, the sovereign state of Zimbabwe was still a fledgling state, so 
understanding the land tenure system it had inherited proved to be a Herculean 
task (Herbst, 1987 in Moyo & Skalness, 1990). Government policy was heavily 
skewed toward supporting large-scale commercial production, even though it 
was buying land and redistributing it to black families; this formed a contradiction 
in policy (Mandaza, 1985). During this period, according to some scholars, the 
LSCF had power and influence through the state (which was upholding the LHC 
constitution) and through the historically institutionalized myths of the superiority 
of large-scale over small scale producers (Weiner et al.,1985; Musimbo, 2005). 
Moyo (1992) refuted this, because small-scale farming was not being supported 
in the same way. In addition to the Communal Lands Act of 1981, the government 
passed the Land Acquisition Act (1985) to speed up market-based land reform. 
This act secured the right of first refusal on any land to the government; thus, 
before any land was put up for sale in Zimbabwe, it first had to be offered to 
the government. This had only a limited effect, as the few lands supplied through 
this means was of poor quality and priced artificially high. Land redistribution 
in the unfettered markets was profiting the white settlers even more, even while 
it delayed land redistribution and re-established white settler control in both land 
markets and financial markets. 
More white settlers, the white elite, and foreign companies who had the funds, 
also bought huge tracts of land through the government for wildlife and tourism. 
These groups of people presented themselves as a powerful source of effective 
demand for land in the 1980s (Table 1). In the period from 1980 to 1996, only 
a small black elite managed to purchase land from the market through private 
loans secured from such institutions as the Agricultural Finance Cooperation 
(AFC). However, other black Zimbabweans, traditional authorities, and the 
Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (WVA) were excluded from the 
land markets. The force of their agency to access land was not yet radicalized. 
It is noteworthy that the access of women to land at this stage was extremely 
low. Even in the white settler farms, women only owned less than 5% of the 
title deeds, and land markets were extremely male dominated. However, Moyo 
pointed out that even though the resulting political pressure was not enough to 
radicalize the land question, it did manage to keep it on the agenda through 
the ESAP era. Furthermore, the would-be salient voices of the WVA were muted, 
and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were also in a dormant stage during 
these times (Table 1). The black elite were also suppressed to some extent, 
although the majority purchased land outside the land redistribution program 
(Moyo, 2002a). 
Consequently, the state led the demand for market-based land reform, but it 
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was limited by the LHC until its expiration in 1990. The government was 
expected to gain control of the land-delivery channels once LHC had passed. 
By 1990, only 70,000 families had been resettled, out of a target of 160,000, 
on 7% of arable lands. Funding from the UK, Germany, and the United States 
of America did not flow to the government, as agreed in the LHC. By 1988, 
the flow of funds had been drastically reduced, with only £44 million being 
received amid tighter restrictions set by the conservative UK government. In 
addition to allowing the white settlers to set the price of the land they wished 
to sell, the LHC agreement gave them the right to choose what currency 
they preferred to be paid in. This further complicated and delayed the land 
market transactions, given the shortages of foreign currency that were rampant 
at that time. The result was stunted progress in land redistribution from 1980 
to 1997. 
2. Economic model and sources of land demand (1990–1996)
The turn of the first decade saw the expiration of the LHC agreement and 
adoption of a new economic production model, as the government announced 
that it had adopted the WB-funded ESAP. Under pressure to reduce economic 
stagnation and rising unemployment, the GoZ erroneously opened up the economy 
and reduced public spending and subsidies, which worsened social infrastructure 
and gave the private sector complete control of the economy. The effect of this 
in the land market was a 180º shift of focus from redistribution to purely 
market-based transactions, which was even worse than under the LHC 
agreement. At this stage, the government was unclear about the implications of 
continued land redistribution (the Land Acquisition Act of 1992-LAA, which 
sought to acquire land through compulsion); at the same time, they followed a 
market-based economy mode of production. On paper, the LAA granted the 
ability to expedite redistribution. It gave the government powers to 
compulsorily acquire land, pay compensation on a non-market basis, limit 
the size of large-scale farms, introduce a land tax, and introduce a system 
of land designation (to enable systematic land acquisition). Dube & Midgley 
Table 1. Source, type and effectiveness of land demand 1980–1997
Period Sources Demand type Influence/Power
1980–1990 Statist 
(later SAP)






White settlers Tenure security High




Source: Adapted from Sam Moyo (various writings).
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(2008) argue that the LAA would have had the potential to hasten land reform 
had it been supported by the local farmers, donors, and the international 
community. Instead, it was ridiculed and, following the recommendations of the 
IMF and World Bank, support was re-focused on large-scale commercial 
production. Land redistribution was shelved during ESAP as the focus shifted 
to the implementation of the economic reforms, under supervision from the 
Bretton Woods institutions (Moyo, 2014: 2). We also note the effect of this 
policy on land use, as more land-use options presented themselves through 
tourism, wildlife, and preservation of bio-diversity (leading to land-grabbing).
Moyo & Skalness (1990) stressed three more factors acting against an increased 
focus on radicalized land markets: 1) the influential party elite who were 
purchasing land at an alarming rate, such that adopting land reform policies 
would go against their interests, 2) the coming together of the two parties ZANU 
and ZAPU in 1987 (institutional/structural forces) de-radicalized the land reform 
movement, and 3) the continued economic crisis extinguished any thoughts of 
state-led radical land reform. By 1995, the prospects of a state-led reform looked 
grim. By 1996, agency from below emerged, increases in the rates of peasants 
squatting on commercial farms, land occupations, popular protests, armed 
confrontations, and resource poaching as a form of agency against a state 
unwilling to do redistributive land reform became widespread (Moyo, 2000a). 
By 1997, ESAP had torn through the land markets, causing disaster and untold 
mayhem to the lives of the rural poor by increasing differentiation in land use, 
labor, and commodity marketing (disregarding the 1992–1995 drought) (Moyo, 
2000b). The state withdrew from the land markets, reduced extension and 
subsidies. The opening up of the economy unlocked access to the land markets 
for foreign capital and the white elite, alienating land further from the general 
populace. More black business capitalists joined the white settlers in their quest 
to access land. CSOs and CBOs were still silent at this stage (Table 1). The 
farmer organizations also failed to incorporate the peasants’ voices, as in most 
cases these were formed by white master-farmers who opposed land redistribution. 
Suddenly realizing the limited options available through neo-liberal markets, the 
state and various stakeholders in the land markets began discussing other ways 
of rapidly redistributing land, including land restitution and state-led land reform.
LAND MARKETS AND REFORM POLICIES, 1997–2010
Although ESAP was officially abandoned in 2001, the government began to 
move away from it in 1996. Budgetary support from the UK had officially 
expired. The Labour Party, newly arrived in power, made it clear that it was 
not going to support further land reform programs through the infamous Clare 
Short letter (Secretary of State for International Development). The intensity of 
land squatting, inversions and occupations grew. The WVA, which had been 
formed in 1989, took it upon themselves to initiate the restructuring of land 
markets.
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I. Land Reform Program Phase 2 (LRP P2, 1997–1999)
Consequently, a number of conferences and meetings were carried out including, 
inter alia, the well-known 1998 Harare Land Reform Donor Conference. Prior 
to the conference, a land task force was established, which saw the implementation 
of the program and that it adhered to the agreed guidelines. These included 
identifying farms and publishing a list of them in the Financial Gazette to give 
time for the farm owners to challenge the process. The government identified 
1,471 farms for resettlement. An array of variables, ranging from land under-
utilization, multiple farm ownership, derelict land, absentee farm-owners and 
proximity to communal areas (CAs) were used to identify farms (Moyo, 2000b). 
This raised concern among a variety of stakeholders leading into the 1998 
conference resulting in the concerned parties being brought together to discuss 
redistribution and resettlement options. At this stage, there were low-key land 
occupations by CA people as they occupied white farms near them. The state 
sent the police and sometimes the army to stop these “illegal” occupations. 
Sadly, the program failed. It was implemented within a liberalized market that 
put emphasis on the private property rights of white settlers. Just as in the 1993 
and 1995 court cases against the state’s compulsory land acquisition program, 
the landowners challenged and won back 40% of these farms. After this, farm 
occupations intensified, beginning with the well-known one in the village of 
Svosve in 1998 and spreading to other areas such as Manicaland, Masvingo, 
and even Matabeleland (despite poor soils and rainfall for crop production in 
that area). This time around, the peasants (through the WVA) had amassed 
political connections and were no longer facing state resistance. While other 
scholars (Elich, 2002; Human Rights Watch, 2002) viewed this social movement 
as the work of the powerful elite of the ZANU PF party, Moyo (2000a) opposed 
it, arguing that the WVA had established itself with the influential elite. Moyo 
(2000a) maintained that the government, realizing the extent of the land 
occupations and pressure for land by the poor, had co-opted it into its land 
acquisition agenda.
Upon realizing this, the international community began to take the Zimbabwe 
situation seriously. A UK mission was dispatched to Zimbabwe (representing 
Europe and the United States) to negotiate with Mugabe. A report was created 
by this mission, which concluded, again, that the government of Zimbabwe was 
on the verge of appropriating land from white farmers without compensation, a 
move they had been trying to push through into the constitution ever since the 
Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Moyo, 1994; 2000b; Moyo & Yeros, 2007). The 
1998 donor conference was subsequently organized to try and mobilize funding 
to the Zimbabwe government so that it would pay compensation. The property 
rights that were defined in the constitution in 1980 were still being protected 
under law, which delayed the compulsory land acquisition process, much to the 
chagrin of the state, WVA, and elite political leaders, further fueling radicalism. 
The WVA, peasants, and the state itself were starting to realize the impracticality 
of any land reform approaches that respected the private property rights of the 
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white settlers. Moyo argued, in this context, that the intense resistance of the 
white settlers played a great role in the eventual radical land reform. 
Thus, 1997 marked the threshold of land reform strategy in Zimbabwe, 
given that it raised the question of whether the ruling party and its 
government could muster serious political resolve to challenge the legacy 
of settler land and property rights as enshrined in existing legislation and 
the “rule of law” (Moyo, 2000b).
The 1998 donor conference took place in September. In attendance were 
representatives of 48 countries and other international donor organizations. The 
most significant outcome of this conference was the agreement to set up a task 
force for joint land reform (to launch the second phase of land reform), which 
the international community and donor agencies would fund. This was an attempt 
to find a balance between land acquisitions and market-based redistribution 
(Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Nevertheless, the UK agreed to join but the GoZ had 
to meet certain conditions, such as a reduction of human rights violations and 
improvements in the levels of democracy (Hanyama, 2009). However, in doing 
this, it failed to understand how these issues where part of the national land 
question. The donor conference crumbled. 
By 1999, GoZ still was not able to smoothly redistribute the remaining 60% 
of farms, as more court challenges came. This unified the peasants, the state, 
WVA, party officials, and traditional authorities behind the land reform agenda. 
For the first time since independence, the WVA had effective power and was 
grounded politically, making it a very powerful agent for reform (see Table 2). 
However, the country was still officially following a neo-liberal economic model, 
which meant, to some extent, that the government was obliged to balance the 
interests of some key white and black capitalist farmers (Moyo, 2002a). Although 
Table 2. Source, type, and effectiveness of land demand 1997–2014
Period Sources Demand type Influence
1997–2007 
State controlled






Foreign capital Tenure security, Leases, Purchase High
State Redistribution High
Peasants Redistribution, Tenure security Medium
ZNWVA Redistribution, Tenure security Medium
Source: Adapted from Moyo (various writings).
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more discussion with the international community ensued from 1998–2001, the 
prospects for a further market-led land-delivery system looked grim. Among 
other conferences, Mugabe met with then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 
September 2000, which saw the UN technical assessment team arrive in Harare. 
Eventually, they concluded that the framework for land reform was in place, 
but the process faced huge legal challenges, which would slow down any reform 
(Moyo, 2002a). Further inquiries through Obasanjo culminated in the Zimbabwe 
issue being tabled in the Commonwealth, eventually coming to be discussed by 
a team of nine ministers from member states (including the UK) in Abuja. The 
result was the Abuja commitments, which, again were halted by UK as it refused 
to honor the agreed terms of the meeting. Eventually, the UN and all donors 
advised the Zimbabwe government to delay the FTLRP indefinitely. The 
Zimbabwe government refused.
To this end, the GoZ attempted and failed to push a referendum to amend 
the constitution to allow it to seize farms without compensation. Interestingly, 
NGOs and CBOs came to life here, on the opposite pole of the land reform 
agenda. Most NGOs failed to admit the reality of the need for land reform, and 
others criticized it without giving alternatives.
II. Fast Track Land Reform Program (2000–2010)
In the wake of the failed donor’s conference, failed LRP P2, and a rejected 
referendum (1997–2000), small cases of land occupations, farm inversions, 
and squatting then developed into full-scale occupations that would last until 
2003–2004. Once the peasants and WVA put the FTLRP into motion, the 
state responded with a new land acquisition law in 2000, which finally 
removed the need to pay compensation for the invaded farms. In this respect, 
a state-led economic model of production was adopted, which saw the GoZ 
reasserting authority throughout the agrarian markets from input distribution to 
output marketing. Between the first rejection of the referendum in February and 
July 2000, the GoZ engaged WVA, the elite of the ruling party, landowners and 
donors again (the UK in April and the UNDP in June) to find amicable ways 
of performing the inevitable land reform. This proved futile and resulted in an 
escalation of confrontation leading to the full-scale state led FTLRP by August 
2000 (Moyo, 2002a). As highlighted, power and control over land markets was 
in the hands of the masses by May 2000. Even the GoZ and some in the elite 
of the party feared losing control over the situation (Moyo & Matondi, 2004). 
The WVA has been described by scholars as a toothless bulldog; however, it 
managed to keep the land question on the agenda. It radicalized the question 
by mobilizing grassroots support from the congested CAs (Table 2). 
This highlights WVA’s ability to engage with the general populace to garner 
support at the same time as developing political alliances with the political elite, 
thus guaranteeing the success of land reforms (Moyo, 2002b). The state later 
gained control by creating District, Provincial, and National Land Committees, 
composed of representatives of the land demand drivers (WVA, government 
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officials, national security officials, party officials, and local traditional authorities), 
through which land seekers could apply for land.
Although the WVA was already carrying out land occupations, officially, the 
FTLRP was launched in July 2000 as part of the second phase of the land 
reform. It was a completely different creature from the previous land-delivery 
systems. It was ideologically different, in that it no longer respected the property 
rights of the white settlers. This reform was institutionally supported by the 
state, as seen through the addition of constitutional amendments that allow for 
no compensation, removed legal challenges to land occupiers, and provide 
protection for them from eviction (Rural Land Occupiers Act 2000). Some of 
these statutes relied on presidential decrees vested in the Presidential Powers 
Act to be passed. Additionally, the FTLRP was to be taken up in an accelerated 
manner, speeding up land identification, planning, demarcation, and resettlement 
of the people. This program, in a break with the past, had provisions to provide 
basic primary (access roads, dip tanks, and boreholes) and some secondary 
infrastructure (schools and clinics). It was launched countrywide to improve 
comprehensiveness and even redistribution in all provinces, using only locally 
sourced resources (Hanyama, 2009). However, as with the previous reform 
program, the FTLRP hinged on achieving equitable racial land ownership, poverty 
reduction, and increased productivity, which formed the socioeconomic objectives 
of the reform. Furthermore, it targeted the decongestion of CAs, improving their 
land access, and the formation of an indigenous commercial farming sector 
(Moyo, 2002a; Hanyama, 2009). The allocation procedures were affected by the 
land occupations, which started after the 1998 donor conference. The majority 
of the land seekers who took part in the land occupations were later officially 
given usufruct rights (permissive) under the A1 resettlement tenure model, with 
land sizes ranging from 1–30 ha, depending on the natural region (NR). The 
other resettlement tenure system was the A2 model, which was for those who 
proved that they had the means to utilize more land. In general, there are two 
forms of land holding in this model, the one exercised on lands with 30–150 
ha (subject to NR) and those on lands with 150–400 ha. The A2 model 
beneficiaries hold leasehold tenure title. The FTLRP also left some former 
white-owned LSCF and some large corporate farms untouched if they were 
deemed strategic farms. These are still held through freehold tenure title.
The results of the FTLRP have been the focus of debate for the past decade, 
as scholars and government policy makers grapple with the task of fully 
understanding its nature and implications. Moyo (2014) argues that the exclusive 
use of economic variables to measure the impact of the reform is inadequate 
and that there is a need for deeper social and class analysis in addition to 
economic analysis. He proposed the use of a tri-modal agrarian structure. 
Utilization of this tri-modal structure enables analysis of the land reform based 
on such variables as land size (adjusted to reflect differences in quality and the 
agro-ecological potential of the land), the tenure system that the land was under, 
the control of land holdings, access to markets (support), accumulation, labor, 
technical capacity, and organization of production. Analysis of these variables 
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enabled the classification of the beneficiaries into peasants (1.3 million), 
small-to-medium capitalist farmers (30,000), and large-to-corporate capitalist 
farmers (250) (Moyo, 2005b: 42). As alluded to previously, differences in 
these have implications for the mobilization of labor and incomes. By 2010, 
around ten million hectares of land had been redistributed during the FTLRP to 
over 170,000 households under the A2 (commercially oriented, 13% of the land) 
and A1 (small scale, 70% of the land) settlement models. This was 10 times 
the land and 2.5 times the number of beneficiaries as in the 1980–1999 reform, 
all done in a quarter of the time. To understand the emerging tri-modal agrarian 
structure, we examine some approaches used to gain access to the land during this 
period, using data from a household survey conducted by SMAIAS (2013–2015). 
The data were collected in six districts, representing the five main agro-ecological 
zones or Natural Region (NR) in Zimbabwe, from NRI (wet region ideal for crop 
production) to NRV (dry region ideal for livestock production). Analysis explores 
this tri-modal approach, examining data collected from the three emerging 
settlement types after the FTLRP (A1, A2, and the CA). In the sections that 
follow, we present evidence to support Moyo’s argument that the FTLRP and 
the pressure for land-market reform and property-rights reform for land emanated 
from below. The characteristics of the people who gained land resemble the 
characteristics of the groups of people who, as the bulk of Moyo’s writing 
makes clear, were in the forefront of land demand before the FTLRP.
1. Land access approaches and patterns
The land markets are now dominated by peasants (on less than 10 ha per farm), 
who are settled on 73% of Zimbabwe’s arable land, followed by small-to-medium 
capitalist farmers (30 to 150 ha), settled on 9% of the arable land. The level of 
land quality and quantity, off-farm income, class, influence, and gender and age 
structures differ among peasant farms, which indicates a further differentiated 
control of the land markets (Moyo & Matondi, 2004; Moyo et al., 2014). 
SMAIAS survey data showed that the land access method depended on the type 
of land demanded. Farm occupations were more common in the A1 sector (46.4% 
A1, 12.5% A2), while the A2 sector was dominated by official allocations (84.8% 
in A2, 48.7% in A1). The majority of the A1 beneficiaries took part in the 
land inversions before the official FTLRP started and they were eventually 
regularized. There were also beneficiaries in both the A1 (0.4%) and A2 (0.7%) 
sectors (Fig. 2) who claimed to have purchased the land during the FTLRP 
period, confirming the existence of informal agricultural land markets.
Therefore, across the two settlements, only 33.5% of the beneficiaries accessed 
land through occupation and the majority’s land was formally allocated (62.5%). 
In general, for the majority of land seekers, access to land in the A2 was 
heavily linked to associational brokering, while that of the A1 was mainly 
participation-based, coupled with negotiations with local land authorities. 
However, participation in the land inversions, engagement with local land 
authorities and WVA did not guarantee land access. It took a great deal of 
dedication and commitment: beneficiaries often had to spend several nights 
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camped in the forest in what became known as “bases,” awaiting re-allocation 
from District Land Committees (Moyo, 2011a; Sadomba, 2011).
2. Periodization of land access
The scale and magnitude of the land reform generally reveals the extent of 
the demand for land in the Zimbabwe land markets. From the SMAIAS data, 
it is clear that approximately 75.7% of the land redistribution occurred between 
2000 and 2003, with the remainder taking place from 2004 to 2015. Interestingly, 
land demands were differentiated in different regions of the country, with some 
regions such as the Mangwe district, having completed 94.5% of its redistribution 
by 2005. Mangwe is in Matabeleland, which is NRV, and it receives very low 
rainfall. However, it was an area that was at the forefront of land occupations 
and land demands from 2000–2003 (Fig. 3). The same situation can also be 
said about the Kwekwe district, which is in Midlands province and is 
predominately NRIII. To a greater extent, these two districts were the base for 
the ZAPU party before the unity accord of 1987. This finding seems to confirm 
Moyo’s (1992) argument that the unity-accord between the two political parties 
de-radicalized the land reform agenda in Matabeleland. Other regions came late 
Fig. 2. Mode of land access for landholders by type of settlement
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
Fig. 3. Scale of land allocation from 2000 to 2013
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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to the party, as evidenced in the Midlands, where the highest number of land 
allocations occurred after 2004. A higher proportion of land allocations that took 
place from 2004 were in the A2 rather than in the A1 sector, a situation that 
obtained in all the districts surveyed (Fig. 3). The rate of land allocations per 
year was highest in the first three years of the FTLRP. The pace of land 
allocations between 2000 and 2002 was faster for A1 (inversions) and, later, the 
use of formal channels took center stage from 2002 onwards. Although 
occupations or informal allocations persisted up to 2006, their scale was 
significantly lower.
3. Socioeconomic characteristics of land beneficiaries
Media reports and academic literature have suggested that the politically 
connected elite, WVA members, and their immediate families were the only 
beneficiaries of the land reform. A socioeconomic analysis of the beneficiaries 
is necessary to understand who they are beyond the war veterans or political 
elite rhetoric.
(1) Geographic origins of land beneficiaries
The origins of beneficiaries played a significant role in the type and amount 
of land they could access. As Moyo (2000b) noted, the manner in which the 
1,471 farms were chosen in 1997 and 1998 depended on their distance from 
CAs, to reduce the cost of relocation. Most land occupations occurred in farms 
close to CAs, as in the occupations of the villages of Masvingo and Svosve 
during the initial stages of the FTLRP (Cliffe, 2000; Moyo, 2000a). The FTLRP 
wanted to reduce overcrowding and poverty rates in these areas. For this reason, 
most land beneficiaries (53.6%) in the SMAIAS 2013–2014 survey came from 
the CAs (Table 3). Furthermore, the biggest number of land beneficiaries came 
from CAs within the immediate district (24.8%), followed by those from within 
the immediate province (19.6%), while those from other provinces were 9.2% 
of land beneficiaries within this group. Hence the distance from the area of 
origin to the desired or demanded piece of land bore heavily on the extent and 
the scope of land demand in land markets. These questions the widely held 
belief that most land was taken by the political elite, who predominately stayed 
in the diaspora.
Urbanites commanded a significant proportion of the participants in the FTLRP 
process, as 29.7% of those resettled originated from urban areas. Here, it is 
noteworthy to highlight the role of the tri-modal approach, since it was a 
deliberate state policy to create a new agrarian middle class. This state-led 
reform policy was able to articulate protests across the rural-urban spaces and 
simultaneously radicalize the working-class (Moyo, 2011a). The third-largest 
group of people came from former large-scale commercial farms, accounting 
for 9.3% of the land beneficiaries (90% of them coming from the same 
district). This group of people mainly included former farm workers in 
formerly white-owned farms. Interestingly, some media reports suggested that 
the program only benefited rural dwellers who supported the ruling party. 
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Furthermore, some studies argue that land could only be accessed around each 
individual’s area of origin (this was only true for farm workers); on the contrary, 
people could generally apply for or take part in land occupations as was they 
saw fit. 
(2) Family structure (size and membership) of beneficiaries  
The driving force behind the demand for land in the markets is also visible 
in the sizes of beneficiaries’ families, as they sought to secure land to subdivide 
or bequeath to family. The plurality of households from the CA in the A1 sector 
generally had a family size range of 3–5 members per farm beneficiary (36.1%), 
while the second most common range was 6–7 members (26.7% of respondents), 
followed by 8–9 members per household (14.9%) (Fig. 4). Generally, A2 farms 
relied mostly on hired labor and had fewer members in their households than 
the CA and the A1 (SMAIAS, 2014). At the extreme end of the A2, in the CA 
there were larger families than in the resettled areas. 
(3) Educational levels of land beneficiaries
Survey results revealed that the educational level of the participants of the 
land markets varied from no formal education to having a tertiary degree. A 
plurality (43.4%) of those who took part in land resettlement had a basic level 
of education (ordinary level), followed by primary education (33.1%), and tertiary 
education (13.9%). Approximately 7.8% of participants had no formal education 
(Table 4). Level of education also affects planning, power and influence in 
Table 3. Place of origin by settlement type
Place of origin
A1 A2 Total
No. % No. % No. %
Total CA 311 63.9 102 36.0 413 53.6 
CA in this district 147 30.2 44 15.5 191 24.8 
CA in this province 114 23.4 37 13.1 151 19.6 
CA from other provinces 50 10.3 21 7.4 71 9.2 
Total LSCF 56 11.5 16 5.7 72 9.3 
LSCF in this district 52 10.7 13 4.6 65 8.4 
LSCF in this province 4 0.8 3 1.1 7 0.9 
Diaspora 1 0.2 0 0.0 1 0.1 
Urban area 88 18.0 140 49.4 228 29.7 
Place of employment 14 2.9 15 5.3 29 3.8 
Old resettlement 13 2.7 5 1.8 18 2.3 
Other places 4 0.8 5 1.8 9 1.2 
Total 487 100.0 283 100.0 770 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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societal processes: that is, it can be a source of inclusion or exclusion (SMAIAS, 
2014). 
(4) Employment profiles of beneficiaries 
The 1980–1990 land reform targeted the unemployed, ex-combatants, and 
ex-farm workers in an effort to provide them with alternative sources of livelihood. 
This has been criticized by proponents of market-based approaches, who argue 
Fig. 4. Household size by model
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
Table 4. Education levels attained by plot owner for newly resettled farmers
Education level attained
A1 A2 CA Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
No formal education 45 9.6 8 2.7 32 10.2 85 7.8 
Total primary 188 39.8 45 15.2 125 39.7 358 33.1 
Some primary education 104 22.0 16 5.4 68 21.6 188 17.3 
Completed primary education 84 17.8 29 9.8 57 18.1 170 15.8 
Total ‘O’ level 205 43.4 118 39.9 148 46.9 471 43.4 
Some secondary education 84 17.8 41 13.9 65 20.6 190 17.5 
Completed secondary education 121 25.6 77 26.0 83 26.3 281 25.9 
Total ‘A’ level 5 1.1 14 4.7 0 0.0 19 1.8 
Total tertiary 29 6.1 111 37.3 10 3.2 150 13.9 
College education 21 4.4 42 14.2 8 2.5 71 6.6 
University degree 7 1.5 69 23.3 2 0.6 78 7.2 
Vocational training 1 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 
Total 472 100.0 296 100.0 315 100.0 1,083 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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that the unemployed are not in a position to productively utilize the land, because 
they lack capital and the ability to access the capital. Moyo & Skalness (1990), 
however, argued that to restructure agrarian markets effectively, granting the 
general populace access to land was extremely necessary. However, land reform 
on its own was not sufficient; institutional, policy, and financial support were 
equally important.
In the SMAIAS household survey, a plurality of the respondents had been 
previously employed (40.6%) while a slightly lower number (38.5%) had never 
been employed prior to accessing land. Approximately 20.9% of the households 
were currently employed (Table 5). This gives an indication of the extent of 
demand for land as seen through higher proportions of people who took part 
in land resettlement programs despite being in employment. This analysis helps 
us to understand the levels of skill, size of networks, extent of habits built over 
time, and depth of the resource bases of the landholders. The largest proportion 
of farmers who had never been formally employed was found in the CA (50.2%) 
and A1 (42.8%); they were being given a source of livelihood by the land 
reform program.
On the other hand, the majority of the A2 land participants (52.2%) had been 
previously employed. Further disaggregation of previously employed households 
shows that a greater number of these stopped working in 2000–2006 in both 
the two resettlement models (A1 [41.3%] and A2 [49.0%]). This period was the 
farm establishment phase, when farmers were settling into their new land, which 
may indicate that a number of farmers left their employment to be full-time 
farmers, especially in the A2 sector.
4. Gender composition of land holders
Women’s ownership of, and access to, land has been a contentious issue in 
the literature (Moyo et al., n.d.). Women’s role in agriculture cannot be overstated, 
as they are at the forefront of virtually all farm activities, from household 
Table 5. Previous employment status of landholders 
Periodization of employment
A1 A2 CA Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Never been employed 204 42.8 57 19.2 158 50.2 419 38.5 
Total previously employed 201 42.1 155 52.2 86 27.3 442 40.6 
Previously 
employed
Before 1995 33 (16.4) 16 (10.3) 21 (24.4) 70 (15.8)
1996 to 1999 33 (16.4) 17 (11.0) 10 (11.6) 60 (13.6)
2000 to 2006 83 (41.3) 76 (49.0) 20 (23.3) 179 (40.5)
2007 to 2014 52 (25.9) 46 (29.7) 35 (40.7) 133 (30.1)
Currently employed 72 15.1 85 28.6 71 22.5 228 20.9 
Grand total 477 100.0 297 100.0 315 100.0 1,089 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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production to reproduction. However, there remains a mismatch between their 
role in the sector and their level of land access, a situation obtaining even during 
the era of the white settlers, when women owned just under 5% of the arable 
land (Rugube et al., 2003; Moyo, 2005b). In the old resettlement areas, 5% of 
the land was held by black women in their own right. Some studies have argued 
that women had access to land through their spouses (83% of women respondents 
in the SMAIAS survey, Fig. 5), since most men who have land have wives 
who have equal access to the land (new tenure laws require registration of the 
wife [wives] if a land holder is married). However, this is open to varied 
interpretations, as differences in rights exist between different households: one 
wife may have access to the land while another does not.
By 2010, women’s access to land was estimated to be between 12% and 18% 
(Buka, 2002; Utete, 2003; GoZ, 2007). Furthermore, access to A2 land presented 
increased constraints, as beneficiaries needed proof of ability to produce before 
they could access the land. This discouraged the participation of women, who 
are historically disadvantaged and denied access. Some women entered their 
husband or son’s names when applying for land to ensure access during the 
land reform (Buka, 2002; Utete, 2003; GoZ, 2007).
In the SMAIAS survey, women accounted for 19.7% of all land beneficiaries 
who received land in their own right in the resettlement areas. As expected, the 
percentage of woman beneficiaries was higher in the A1 (23.2%) than in the 
A2 (16.2%). A greater number of women accessing land were widows (59.7%), 
followed by those who received land in their own right but were monogamously 
married (22.6%) (Table 6).
Fig. 5. Gender of plot owner by settlement type
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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EMERGING LAND MARKETS AFTER THE FTLRP
The demand for land from around 2007 onwards took a new twist, especially in 
light of the global food crisis, which saw global markets pushing for large-scale 
oriented food production systems to ensure global food security. There was still 
great demand for land among local people, as can be seen in the ever-growing list 
of applications for it. By 2009, the government had managed to identify 760,000 
ha, which was demanded by 100,000 land seekers. Post-FTLRP, there has been 
a resurgence of foreign capital into Zimbabwe land markets through collusion 
with government, the elite, CSOs, and MNC (land grabbing). These will be 
discussed in this section. Emerging markets are characterized by large-scale land 
deals as well as localized land sharing, leasing, and renting.
I. Agricultural Land Markets after FTLRP
The FTLRP nationalized all agricultural land; therefore, no land sales can 
occur under the currently available land tenure. However, new forms of local 
and international land deals emerged post-reform, signaling a new dimension in 
the land markets (Moyo, 2009).
1. Informal land market
The nationalization of land brought with it a new tenure system that allows 
no land transactions of any nature without state approval, thereby making any 
subsequent land transactions informal. However, these markets have persisted. 
The extent of this market depends on a variety of factors, including inter-settlement 
class struggles.
SMAIAS (2014) underscores the difficulty of collecting data on informal deals 
and land sharing arrangements. However, approximately 5.9% of the respondents 
to the SMAIAS survey openly agreed that they were sharing their land, and the 
numbers were highest in the resettlement areas, A1 (7.5%) and A2 (7.1%) (Table 
7). It is very important to note that these findings may grossly underestimate 
Table 6. Gender of landholder by marital status and settlement type 
A1 A2 CA Total
male female male female male female male female
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Monogamy 288 79.1 31 28.4 223 90.3 18 36.7 184 81.5 7 7.8 695 83.0 56 22.6 
Polygamy 44 12.1 5 4.6 12 4.9 1 2.0 21 9.3 3 3.3 77 9.2 9 3.6 
Single 6 1.6 4 3.7 3 1.2 4 8.2 5 2.2 1 1.1 14 1.7 9 3.6 
Divorced 9 2.5 9 8.3 4 1.6 5 10.2 1 0.4 12 13.3 14 1.7 26 10.5 
Widowed 17 4.7 60 55.0 5 2.0 21 42.9 15 6.6 67 74.5 37 4.4 148 59.7 
Total 364 100.0 109 100.0 247 100.0 49 100.0 226 100.0 90 100.0 837 100.0 248 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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the occurrence of informal land markets post FTLRP. This is an area that requires 
further study.
In the A1 sector, most land sharing was done with relatives and/or friends 
(83.3%), followed by former farm workers (8.3%), a situation also obtaining in 
the land sharing deals in the CAs. In the A2 sector, with its larger amounts of 
land, 47.6% of land sharers were former farm workers, followed by relatives 
and/or friends (33.3%). In land sharing in the A2 sector, where the plurality of 
the landholders shares their land with their employees, access to land may be 
tied to the provision of labor on the same farm. Resettled farmers engage in 
these land deals to incentivize their workers. Consequently, A2 farmers were 
found to share land, mostly, with farmworkers, while A1 farmers mostly shared 
and leased out land to friends and relatives (Fig. 6).
Informal interviews show that a significant number of white former farmers 
and foreign capital owners (South African, Chinese, etc.) are working with black 
farmers on their allocated pieces of land to produce tobacco, wheat, and soybean. 
The presence of foreign capital in these markets had accentuated government 
fears of a reversal of the land redistribution process. The government has tried 
to re-gain control of these informal land market activities by formulating 
land-sharing policies that require that land-sharing deals be done through the 
Table 7. Land sharing by settlement type 
Is there anyone else with 
access to your land?
Settlement type
A1 A2 CA Total
N % N % N % N %
Yes 36 7.5 21 7.1 7 2.2 64 5.9 
No 442 92.5 274 92.9 309 97.8 1,025 94.1 
Total 478 100.0 295 100.0 316 100.0 1,089 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
Fig. 6. Non-farm owners with access to land by settlement type
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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Ministry of Lands. Although the rural lands act (20:18) has provisions for 
sharecropping and the leasing of land through the ministry, further informal 
interviews found that the majority of these deals were informal (the ministry 
was not notified). Overall, 68.8% of those sharing land did so with friends and 
relatives, while 20.3% shared land with their farm workers. This also points to 
the feared, unanswered land question in agrarian studies. These informal land 
market deals necessitate debating a second land reform and LSCF-sector land 
downsizing in Zimbabwe. 
II. Land Tenure Issues after FTLRP
The reform program drastically reconfigured property rights to land, which 
has had huge effects on the land markets. Contemporary tenure issues have 
mainly been driven by foreign capital pushing for the re-establishment of private 
property rights, as they argue that the reform rendered land as dead capital (De 
Soto, 2000). However, it is not a given that titling can automatically lead to 
success in the aftermath of the FTLRP, as it could also lead to increased class 
and racial clashes, which would depress economic and social development and 
trust in property titles once again (see Martin, 2008). Some farms are still held 
under freehold tenure, especially the farms that were termed strategic for the 
economy during the FTLRP. In the SMAIAS household survey, 83% of the 
resettled farmers held offer letters (permissive tenure) as ownership documents, 
Fig. 7. Type of tenure document possessed by landholders
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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while 13.3% and 2.6% are reported to have already-processed permits and 99-year 
leases, respectively (Fig. 7). From the initial stages of the FTLRP, the GoZ has 
tried to provide constitutional provisions to protect land beneficiaries and the 
process of land redistribution (e.g., constitutional amendment 97 of 2006, which 
removed the need for payment of compensation for repossessed land) as well 
as those who recognized the ownership rights of the land seekers who took part 
in the initial farm occupations.
The anticipated illegal land-market deals have basically been the driving force 
for the GoZ’s stance on issuing private property ownership rights to newly 
resettled farmers. It is feared that the demand for land by global capital will 
increase land values and, as a result of decreasing profits for small-scale producers, 
farmers might be forced to sell off their land (Pinckney & Kimuyu, 1994), thus 
reversing land reform. Land-tenure issues remain contested, especially between 
the GoZ and the private sector (the agricultural finance stakeholders), in terms 
of the level of security of tenure in current lease and offer letters in agricultural 
land markets. Although the majority of resettled farmers express confidence in 
the tenure documents they hold as proof of ownership, they are concerned that 
these documents are not accepted by financial institutions as proof of ownership 
(SMAIAS, 2014). Demand for land tenure has been pushed off to some extent 
by the middle and upper classes of land beneficiaries (Moyo, 2011b). 
Approximately 4% of respondents to the SMAIAS survey reported being 
threatened with eviction by government officials, while 0.8% of the respondents 
reported being actually evicted from one farm before being reallocated to another 
one.
Interestingly, approximately 95% of respondents to the survey had tenure 
documents, while 5% had no form of government documentation of ownership 
of land (SMAIAS, 2014). For farmers who faced land-tenure related land conflicts, 
these conflicts were largely boundary disputes (between farmers, reported by 
56.7%) and disagreements over ownership of pieces of land (between farmers 
and GoZ, reported by 28.4%) (Table 8).
Informal interviews have also shown how class struggles remain at the forefront 
Table 8. Type of tenure-related conflicts faced
Type of conflict
A1 A2 Ca Total
N % N % N % N %
Boundary dispute 26 51.0 47 65.2 7 38.9 80 56.7 
Access to natural resources 1 2.0 4 5.6 4 22.2 9 6.4 
Access to infrastructure 1 2.0 1 1.4 0 0.0 2 1.4 
Inheritance 2 3.9 0 0.0 4 22.2 6 4.3 
Ownership of farm/plot 20 39.2 19 26.4 1 5.6 40 28.4 
Other types of conflict 1 1.9 1 1.4 2 11.1 4 2.8 
Total who faced conflicts 51 100.0 72 100.0 18 100.0 141 100.0 
Source: SMAIAS Household Survey (2013–2014).
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of certain farmer-to-farmer conflicts, with those farmers who have limited access 
to resources and no political influence facing more conflicts. Thus, land conflicts 
also have a gender dimension to them. More female than male farmers faced 
more conflicts as male neighbors believe they can increase the size of their land 
holdings by encroaching onto female-owned land. The A2 women landholders 
are more susceptible to land conflicts, reported by 34%, in comparison to the 
10.8% reported in the A1 sector (see SMAIAS, 2014). Other issues raised relating 
to land tenure include a lack of clarity in the role of traditional authorities, who 
seem to have extended their authority from the CAs to the resettled areas, 
complicating the rights that leaseholders or permit holders have over a piece of 
land.
III. Large-scale land investments
The GoZ now controls the major part of all land. This gives ultimate power 
to the state, power that, if misused, may lead to undesirable outcomes. A number 
of scholars have written on the new scramble for Africa and highlighted how 
the state was going to bed with foreign capital. Zimbabwe is no exception when 
it comes to this, with agreements ranging from tourism partnerships to mining 
and agriculture. Government-owned land has been leased to a number of foreign 
investors. Such agreements were in the tourism sector, or various Agricultural 
and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) farms leased out under the Build, 
Operate and Transfer Agreements (BOTA). However, the most recent example 
of this third wave for Zimbabwean land has been the concentration of land for 
sugarcane production aimed at bio-fuels production, whereby some farmers were 
moved to accommodate projects in Mashonaland west, Masvingo, and Manicaland. 
Concerns have been raised about the real motives for these large-scale investments. 
Some of the farmers affected had been newly resettled. Hence, large-scale land 
investments are already reversing land reform. Such investments have also come 
in, disguised as contract farming and/or out-grower systems, as evidenced in 
some cases in the Chiredzi district (Mazwi & Muchetu, 2015).
CONCLUSIONS
Land markets are, and always will be, politicized, consequently justifying 
government intervention. Moyo’s work on land markets, spanning more than 40 
years, offered explanations for the trajectory taken by agricultural land markets 
in terms of who demanded land, what type of demand it was, and how state 
economic production models affected its land-delivery mechanisms. State 
intervention has been constrained by LHC agreements and financial and legal 
systems, which frustrated the peasants, who took it upon themselves to correct 
historic injustices through extra-market approaches. Nevertheless, the success of 
these interventions from below depended heavily on collaboration with state 
apparatus. While it remains a fact that market land transactions should not be 
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eliminated (only regulated), a state-led approach was appropriate and needed to 
be forged. Moyo’s central argument was that market-led land reform, carried 
out under a market-oriented economic model, will always favor capital, the elite, 
and white settlers (a minority) at the expense of the peasantry (the majority). 
Land seekers had varied socioeconomic backgrounds, levels of education, family 
sizes, political influence, and employment histories determining their placement 
within Moyo’s tri-modal agrarian structure. Land markets in Zimbabwe continue 
to be highly unpredictable, in part as a result of the re-emergence of demand 
for land by global capital from 2007 and 2008. This was stimulated by the 
global food crisis, which culminated in a new scramble for land (Moyo’s term) 
or land grabs. At the household level, demand for land continues to be high, as 
seen by the rampant land sharing arrangements in the A1 and A2 sectors. There 
also exist informal land sales between beneficiaries. Beneficiaries derive security 
from their tenure documents, but this highlights the fact that the need for 99-year 
leases stems mainly from the need to use them to secure credit from financial 
institutions. Furthermore, farmers desired these new documents to reduce 
boundary conflicts.
Market-based land reforms and state-led reform approaches remain the major 
forms of land-delivery mechanisms in post-independence Zimbabwe. A limited 
number of beneficiaries have accessed land through informal markets, restitution, 
inheritance, and/or customary approaches. The Zimbabwe land-delivery markets 
have proved that a state-led approach flouts liberal political rights (settlers’ property 
rights), reinvents the law, and scores less in terms of efficiency and democracy 
than market-led land reforms. While market-led reforms respect the existing 
system of law and property rights, they are extremely slow (the pace of 
redistribution 1980–1999) and serve the interests of the resourced at the expense 
of the downtrodden. We have further learned that state-led reforms are able to 
score higher on redistribution; decongestion of the CAs, women and youth 
participation, equity and social rights, correction of historical social injustices, 
and delivering land to the majority in a short space of time, while using minimum 
resources. For successful state-led land reforms, it is important to understand 
clearly the limitations and strengths of the economic production model in place, 
and the magnitude and potential of pressure from below to alter land-delivery 
systems. Furthermore, land reforms must be complemented with land registration 
and the provision of financial services to ensure increased productivity. Finally, 
the strength and limitations of the land delivery channel should be evaluated 
against the objective of land reform. That is to say, market-led land markets, if 
adopted, require regulation and, in cases where historical land injustices prevail, 
state-led interventions become more applicable.
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